BCRA Mr President - Mr. Martin Redrado BCRA
Rte.: Mario Cafiero - Ricardo Monner Sans
Subject: issue mendacious and misleading information relating to the solvency and liquidity of the BCRA, and payment to the Paris Club.
In my consideration:
We went to you and through you to the other directors of BCRA in the belief that you are spreading misleading information relating to the safety and soundness of the institution. We also warn that this behavior "deceitful and disvaliosa-deserved for an urgent judicial inquiry, in the absence of a proper correction immediately.
We refer specifically to the statements made by you on 9/26/1908, which were amplified by the media, whose text is available on the website of the Central Bank. In them you said that "current levels of liquidity, about 40% of deposits, are historically high. This ratio is robust compared to, say, with the levels maintained during the period 1991-2001 (23.4% on average and up to 29.2%). In this way tries to show a strength and soundness by the Central Bank, which is unfortunately far from reality.
In fact, a simple observation of the information provided by this institution in the aforementioned website - "Monetary and Financial Outlook (monthly series)" - shows that these figures may be correct historically, but no compassion for anything with that are now occurring. The liquidity ratio of total deposits "around 40%" as you expressed, was reached last April, before the conflict with the field. But in July dropped to 35% and in August had fallen to 27% if the Central Bank had complied with the Paris Club payment ordered by the Executive. In this regard it should be noted that in October 2001, just before the collapse of convertibility and installation of the yard, this indicator was 33%.
But the criticism we make to you is, both on the amounts reported, as the quality of the information provided. You know very well that refer only to deposits, regardless of the money held by the public, is technically incorrect. It was obviously to use a cosmetic trick to exploit the phenomenon of society desbancarización Argentina that occurred as a result of the yard. It is your full knowledge that after that big scam, which had the architect indispensable to the institution that you are running, by the mistrust generated by the depositor significantly reduced the Argentine banking multiplier or proportion of deposits in relation to the currency in public hands. This happened nine times on the eve of the "yard", a little more than three times today.
Looking at the index called "M3" (the sum of the two) in relation to indicators of liquidity are even more unfavorable. The ratio in July was 28%. And in August have fallen to 21% if it had been paid to the Paris Club. While on the eve of the collapse of convertibility in October 2001, this indicator was 30%. So in all cases the current indicators are worse than the previous the collapse of convertibility.
The issue does not end there. If instead of statistical data are taken from accounting data contained in the liabilities on the balance of BCRA (Securities issued by Central Bank, Operations Term Liabilities and Other Liabilities) these indicators worsen dramatically. Liquidity in relation to deposits declined from 31% in April, to 20% in July. And in August it would have reached 11% if it had made payment to the Paris Club. In turn, the M3 liquidity ratio fell from 25% in April to 16% in July. And in August it would have fallen to 9% if it had finalized the payment to the IMF.
However, unfortunately, the question not end there, as these indicators are developed based on gross international reserves, not the net international reserves (defined by net international reserves to gross international reserves minus debt BCRA international). Taking into account these, the numbers worsen even more, approaching zero. Far from 40% of you falsely boasts to the public. So the numbers drawn by the BCRA, they have nothing to envy liars INDEC numbers.
Without analyzing the quality and consistency of investment to international reserves, which offer serious doubts and objections, nor to consider that half of them has been leveraged by a contraction dangerous to very short-term domestic debt, it is clear that the existence of "historically high levels of reserves" as you claim, is false. It is unfortunate that you repeat the chant that was told the Argentines in early 2001, to meet the end of that year without a weight or miserable dollar in his pocket.
Beyond the technical, critical and realistic analysis of the balances of the Central Bank indicates that minimum prudential reasons, especially in the current circumstances in the world is plagued by an unusual "financial tsunami" International unpredictable consequences BCRA is absolutely unable to make cash payments to the Paris Club ordered by the Executive.
is also verifiable cash payment to the IMF in early 2006, and seriously impair the liquidity and solvency indicators of that institution, had effects that impacted heavily on the rise in interest rates and hence on inflation. Like today, then there alternative ways to avoid both the cash payment, including the supervision of the IMF, based precisely on the responsibility of the IMF in Argentina absurd debacle of the last quarter century, an issue that has even opened a case in court Argentina . Very different would the present state of our economy and society, whether these resources or part of reparations had been overturned in our country, rather vain if any spilled outside.
Consequently, in our capacity as Argentine citizens deeply interested in public affairs, and forks, like millions of Argentines, the currency issued by the public bank:
-warning to you to cease his deception to public opinion about the true strength and ability to pay of the Central Bank. Behavior very similar to that deployed this institution during 2001, the couple is perpetrating a vicious dissection of the Argentine financial system in Argentine savers fraud.
"Summoned to you and through you to the directors of that bank, to fully comply with its core mission stated in the Charter" to preserve the value of the currency, "which despite being very poorly distributed, is a good essential social and public money in our economy. Preserve is a verb that goes far beyond saving. Is to shield our currency in advance of damage or probable or imminent danger, such as those currently hovering.
"Consequently we urge you to oppose the cash payment to the Paris Club of illegally ordained by decrees 1,394 and 1,472, to pay ruinously affect the sustainability of the BCRA, as it is not the Paris Club a" body international finance "and the project involves no" urgent need "to justify the issuance of these decrees bypassing Congress Olympian.
In light of moral demerit of that debt, because it is an illegitimate debt substantially from the bloody dictatorship, which was rejected by Congress, and in light of his lack of opportunity, in the context of financial events are shaking the world would become effective the payment of an act of desadministración ruinous inexplicable and unacceptable, worthy of inclusion in the "History of Human Stupidity" by Tabori, or the "Universal History of Infamy" by Borges.
Attached
by certified mail piece presentation made to the Joint Standing Committee on Legislative Procedure Law 26,122 on the DNU 1.472/08, which contains an analysis referred to the actual state of that institution.
For reasons of force majeure has not been able to accompany this CD with his signature Francisco Javier Llorens who has allowed this information.
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